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ENTRENCHING THE MINORITY: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THAILAND’S 
POLITICAL CONFLICT 
 
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang 
 
Abstract:  Since 2006, Thailand has witnessed an unprecedented 
surge of judicial activism from the Constitutional Court to scrutinize elected 
politicians in the name of the rule of law.  Democracy, argued Constitutional 
Court judges, could only be consolidated if the rule of law was maintained.  But 
examination of several high-profile constitutional cases suggested that the 
Constitutional Court was actually working on behalf of the powerful elite 
minority to obstruct the democratic process under the pretext of protecting the 
rule of law.  This antagonistic position brewed resentment and violence which 
jeopardized the Constitutional Court’s legitimacy as a neutral political arbiter.  
The 2014 coup d’etat showed that once again the country has failed to 
consolidate its democratization.  This failure suggests that the Constitutional 
Court’s notion of the rule of law might not be compatible with the notion of 
electoral democracy.    
INTRODUCTION 
The 1997 political reform in Thailand resulted in the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of democracy.  Its mission 
was to bring Thailand peace and stability but the decade-long political 
conflict from 2006 up to the present indicated otherwise.  Since 2006, 
Thailand witnessed several violent demonstrations as well as two coup 
d’etats.  Much of the conflict surrounded controversial former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who held office from 2001-2006, and can 
be explained as a struggle between his supporters who elected and 
reelected him into power, and his opponents who repeatedly filed 
lawsuits as a means to remove him from power.  In many cases, the 
actions of the Constitutional Court are believed by many to have helped 
escalate tensions to their breaking point.  For example, it endorsed an 
armed occupation of Bangkok,1 dissolved major political parties,2  and 
embraced the military regime’s impunity.3  The Constitutional Court was 
accused of downplaying the importance of a general election while 
emphasizing the rule of law which favored the powerful anti-democratic 
minority.  As a result, the decisions of the Constitutional Court led to a 
                                                 
  Khemthong TONSAKULRUNGRUANG. Ph.D. candidate, the University of Bristol Law 
School. kt15603@bristol.ac.uk. 
1  Constitutional Court [hereinafter Const. Ct.] No. 45/2557, 2014; Const. Ct. No. 50/2557, 
2014. 
2  Const. Ct. No. 1-2/2550, 2007; Const. Ct. No. 3-5/2550, 2007; Const. Ct. No. 18-19-20/2551, 
2008. 
3  Const. Ct. No. 5/2551, 2008. 
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crisis, not a solution.  After beginning as a neutral arbiter of constitutional 
disputes, the Constitutional Court became an active player whose role 
was a decisive factor in winning the political struggle. 
This paper aims to study the Constitutional Court’s role in the 
majority-minority struggle in the post-2006 coup Thailand.  Part I 
provides an overview of Thailand’s attempt to judicialize politics with the 
hope that it would restore public trust and promote clean democracy.  It 
follows the rise and fall of the Constitutional Court between 1997 and 
2016.  Part II then closely examines a selection of Constitutional Court 
cases decided during this time period.  These cases represent the elected 
government’s fight to regain its authority to deliberate public policies.  
Also, these cases reveal how the Constitutional Court understands its role 
in the democratic regime.  Finally, Part III concludes this paper by 
looking at all the factors that led the Constitutional Court to become the 
opponent of the majority.       
I.   JUDICIALIZATION OF THAI POLITICS 
The Constitutional Court of Thailand was a product of the 1997 
political reform, which produced the 1997 People’s Constitution.  This 
political reform was preceded by the 1991 military takeover of the 
civilian government, and the subsequent May 1992 uprising by Thai 
citizens against the military-controlled government.  The violent clash 
forced the military to end its intervention in politics and triggered a 
reform to permanently consolidate democracy.4  
The 1997 Constitution was created with the goals of empowering 
the people and eradicating corruption.5  In addition to having periodic 
free and fair elections, the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) 
created several agencies that would perform a check-and-balance 
function.  The CDA pursued large-scale judiciary reform, and established 
the independent Constitutional Court,6  Administrative Court, 7  and the 
Criminal Division for the Political Office Holders within the Supreme 
Court of Justice.8  Reflecting the CDA’s distrust in civilian politicians, 
the CDA assigned the judiciary the duty to guard fundamental democratic 
principles, such as the rule of law and civil liberties, leading to the 
                                                 
4  CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF THAILAND 250–62 (2d ed. 2014); Tom 
Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand's Postpolitical Constitution, 7 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 83, 89–91 (2008). 
5  Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 94. 
6  Radthathammonoon [THAI CONSTITUTION] (B.E. 2540) — 1997 (ch. 8 § 255). 
7  See id. § 272. 
8  See id. § 276. 
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judicialization of Thai politics.9  In addition to the new courts, the CDA 
created independent watchdog agencies such as the National Counter-
Corruption Commission (NCCC) and the Election Commission (EC), 
which were under neither the Legislative nor Executive branches. 10  
Together, the three newly established courts and these independent 
watchdog agencies, would punish arbitrary officials and uphold the rule 
of law. 
The Constitutional Court was comprised of career judges, legal 
experts, and political scientists who were recruited through a complicated 
nomination process with as little political oversight as possible.11  The 
Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to: (1) review a provision of law and 
the law-making process; (2) settle a jurisdictional dispute among the 
legislature, the executive, and independent watchdog agencies; (3) 
disqualify a corrupt public office holder; and (4) protect the Constitution 
and democratic values. 12   Through judicial review, the Constitutional 
Court could restore trust in the government, which was necessary to 
strengthen Thailand’s weak democracy.  
The conception of the Constitutional Court was not without 
resistance.  Prior to the Constitutional Court, the Thai legal system only 
had been used to having only the Court of Justice which had a universal 
jurisdiction.  The idea of having specialized courts for public law disputes 
was a novel one.  The Court of Justice opposed the idea of having 
professional and non-lawyer judges, as well as the idea of adjudicating 
political disputes.13  It feared that the Constitutional Court would invite 
political influence into the judiciary.14  However, the CDA managed to 
                                                 
9  Bjoern Dressel, Court and Judicialization in Southeast Asia, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEMOCRATIZATION 268, 272–77 (William Case ed., 2009); See Thirayuth 
Boonmee, Too-la-karn-pi-vat, [Judicial Activism] (2006) (The strongest advocate for judicialization of 
politics was perhaps Thirayuth Boonmee, a then lecturer in sociology at Thammasart University, who 
first coined the term judicial activism.). 
10  Duncan McCargo, Introduction: Understanding Political Reform in Thailand, in ‘REFORMING 
THAI POLITICS’ 1, 10–11 (Duncan McCargo ed. 2001).   
11  Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2540) — 1997 (ch. 8 § 255–56); Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, 
The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual Analysis; Historical Analysis and Contemporary 
Issues in Thai Constitutionalism, SOAS L. 166–69 (2011). 
12  Harding & Leyland, supra note 11, at 165; For more details, see also Khemthong 
Tonsakulrungruang, The Anti-Majoritarian Constitutional Court of Thailand, presented at the 6th Asian 
Constitutional Forum, Singapore, Dec. 11, 2015, 7–10. 
13  Harding & Leyland, supra note 11, at 159–61, 191–95 (prior to 1997, the Court of Justice was 
the only judicial institution.  Judges were professional lawyers recruited through a state entrance 
examination.  Its jurisdiction covered all private disputes, criminal or civil.  Constitutional and 
administrative disputes were subject to the Constitutional Council and the Council of State 
respectively.  Both the Constitutional Council and the Council of State belonged to the executive 
branch).   
14  James Klein, The Battle for Rule of Law in Thailand: the Constitutional Court of Thailand, in 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THAILAND: THE PROVISIONS AND THE WORKING OF THE COURT 35, 
 
250 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.  26 NO.  2 
 
convince the opposition otherwise and the Constitutional Court began 
operating in 1998.   
The early years of the Constitutional Court produced mixed results 
for those hoping for independent judicial review and the protection of 
strong democratic institutions.  In many early cases, the Constitutional 
Court often deferred to the government’s position. 15   However, it 
delivered a few important decisions in favor of gender equality, rights of 
occupation, and rights in criminal justice processes. 16   Also, it 
disqualified and banned several high-profile politicians who were found 
guilty of filing false asset statements by the National Counter-Corruption 
Commission.17  
Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court made a few mistakes too.  
Accused politicians were sometimes spared despite their obvious 
misconduct.18  For example, in 2003, the Constitutional Court acquitted 
Thaksin Shinwatra, then a popular businessman-turned-politician and 
potential Prime Minister candidate even though four judges had voted not 
guilty against seven who had voted guilty.19  The four abstaining votes 
were then counted as not guilty resulting in an 8/7 decision.20  Normally, 
the abstaining votes should not have been counted as not guilty.  
Moreover, the Constitutional Court raised the standard of proof from 
finding a normal intention that Thaksin was aware of his undisclosed 
properties to a special intention that Thaksin deliberately lied about his 
assets.21  
                                                                                                                                           
36–37 (Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein eds., 2003); Harding & Leyland, supra note 11, at 161–
62. 
15  Borwornsak Uwanno, Economic Crisis and Political Crisis in Thailand: Past and Present, 4:3 
NAT’L TAIWAN UNI. L. REV. 141, 147–50 (2009).   
16  Kla Samudavanija, Khob-Ked-Am-Nat-Nha-Tii-Sarn-Ratthathammanoon-pheu-song-serm-
karn-pok-krong-nai-ra-bob-prachathippatai-lae-kum-krong-sitthi-seri-paph-khong-pra-cha-chon 
[Scope of Power and Duty of the Constitutional Court for Promotion of Democratic Rule and 
Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties] King Prajadhipok’s Institute Research Paper 14-15 (2014) 
[Thai.] [KPI Research]; see Const. Ct. No. 21/2546, 2003; Const. Ct. No. 25/2547, 2004; Const. Ct. 
No. 30/2548, 2005.  For judicial deferral, see Klein, supra note 14, at 43–45; Const. Ct. No. 5/2541, 
1998; Const. Ct. No. 4/2542, 1999. 
17  Klein, supra note 14, at 60, 70. 
18  Const. Ct. No. 36/2542, 1999 (a minister received a pending imprisonment sentence which 
should disqualify him from the office.  However, the Constitutional Court interpreted a disqualification 
clause as an actual imprisonment so the accused minister could still retain his seat in the cabinet); See 
Const. Ct. No. 4/2544, 2001 (the Constitutional Court acquitted ten members of the cabinet who still 
held shares in business entities, citing the lack of evidence for conflict of interest). 
19  Const. Ct. No. 20/2544, 2001. 
20  Id. 
21  Const. Ct. No. 20/2544, 2001; See Klein, supra note 14, at 74–76; Samudivanija, supra note 
16, at 169–70 (criticisms of the decision in Const. Ct. No. 20/2544, 2001). 
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The mistake was costly.  Subsequently, Thaksin rose to prime-
ministership in 2001 and dominated almost all branches of government.  
His popularity left the House of Representatives with an opposition too 
small to stop him. 22   His wealth and deal-making ability secretly 
controlled the Senate and other watchdog agencies, rendering the system 
of checks-and-balances ineffective.23  With diminishing oversight, many 
of Thaksin’s policies infringed upon rights and liberties of Thais while 
enriching himself and his supporters.24  The concerned public asked the 
Constitutional Court to scrutinize Thaksin’s actions but the Court always 
deferred to the government.25  The Constitutional Court’s deferrals to the 
government started to upset the public so there were calls for the 
judiciary, as the only remaining institution resistant to Thaksin’s grip, to 
be more aggressive in keeping the Prime Minister in check.26  The call for 
judicial activism resonated even in the Royal speech to judges during 
their swear-in ceremony.27  
Although the Constitutional Court finally responded to the call for 
activism by invalidating the 2006 general election,28 it was too late to 
rescue its credibility.  A military coup followed month-long 
demonstrations in September 2006.  The Council for National Security 
(CNS) abolished the 1997 Constitution and temporarily suspended the 
Constitutional Court.29  The CNS replaced the Constitutional Court with 
                                                 
22  BAKER & PONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at 267; Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 97. 
23  Kevin Hewison, Constitutions, Regimes and Power in Thailand, 14:5 CONTEMPORARY 
POLITICS 928, 935–36 (2007).  
24  PASUK PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAKSIN: THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS IN THAILAND 
197-224 (1st ed. 2004); Kevin Hewison, Thaksin Shinwatra and the Reshaping of Thai Politics 16:2 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 119–33 (2010); Vivit Muntarbhorn, Human Rights in the Era of “Thailand 
Inc.”, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA 320–45 (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., 2006). 
25  See Thitinan Pongsudhirak, The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution, in DIVIDED OVER THAKSIN: 
THAILAND'S COUP AND PROBLEMATIC TRANSITION 34 (N. John Funston ed., 2009). 
26  See Bjoern Dressel, Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary? 
Considerations from Recent Events in Thailand, 23:5 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 671, 673 (2010). 
27  Id., at 680. Although the king is assumed to be “above politics”, there were evidences that the 
Thai monarchy, from time to time, intervened in political crises.  Still, making such request in public 
was a rare occurrence.  See Thongchai Winichakul, Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Two Elephants in 
the Room and the State of Denial in Thailand, in GOOD COUP GONE BAD 79 (Pavin 
Chatchavalpongpun ed. 2014). 
28  Const. Ct. No. 9/2549, 2006 (Thaksin’s opposition staged a month-long protest that forced 
Thaksin to dissolve the House and called for a snap election.  However, the opposition parties all 
boycotted the election for Thaksin set the date too early.  They also urged voters to vote no.  The 
Constitutional Court found the 2006 election unconstitutional due to several irregularities, i.e. low 
voter turnout and unusually high number of ballots that casted vote to no candidate, the outcome which 
allowed Thaksin’s party the only main party in the Parliament, and the Election Commission’s 
unjustifiable change of electoral practice that could enable easier frauds). 
29  The Council of National Security Declaration No. 3 (B.E. 2549, 2006). 
252 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.  26 NO.  2 
 
the Constitutional Council.30  The Constitutional Council went on to find 
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party guilty of electoral fraud, dissolved 
the party, and, under the CNS’s direction, banned TRT executives from 
running for office for five years.31  Undoubtedly, the election invalidation 
and the dissolution of TRT showed Thaksin’s opponents that the 
judiciary could be an effective tool to counter a politician’s popularity. 
The Constitutional Council was automatically dissolved when the 
Constitutional Court resumed operating after the 2007 Constitution came 
into effect.  The 2007 Constitution was fueled by distrust of elected 
politicians.32  It so rigorously pursued the goal of building a transparent 
Thailand that it expanded the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction and 
increased judicial independence from political oversight.33  The modified 
Constitutional Court was more powerful and isolated than ever.  The 
2007 Constitution also, for the first time, commanded that all state 
apparatus shall operate in accordance with the rule of law.34  The rule of 
law clause signified the changing focus of the supreme law from building 
institutions responsive to the people’s needs to selecting public office 
holders with desirable personal ethics.   
The judicial activism movement has hardly died down.  Since 
2008, the Constitutional Court has heard a number of high-profile cases 
and provided more rigorous protection of the rights and liberties of Thai 
citizens.35 Its achievements were clouded, however, by growing numbers 
of politically sensitive cases concerning abuse of power, conflict of 
interest, and the rule of law.  Parties were dissolved, policies revoked, 
and individuals dismissed.  Post-2006 Thailand was badly divided and the 
2007 Constitutional Court faced a very challenging terrain.  The political 
process was riddled with month-long demonstrations, violent 
crackdowns, and lawsuits.36  Often, the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
further enflamed controversies rather than ending them, which prompted 
                                                 
30  Thai Interim Charter (B.E. 2549, 2007) (§ 35) (The panel consisted of the President of the 
Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, five Supreme Court judges and 
two Supreme Administrative Court judges).   
31  Const. Council. Decision No. 3-5/2550, 2007.   
32  Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 104.   
33  Borwornsak Uwanno, Economic Crisis and Political Crisis in Thailand: Past and Present, at 
163–66.   
34  Radthathammonoon  (B.E. 2550) — 2007 (ch. 1 § 3). 
35  Samudavanija, supra note 16, at 149–66. 
36  BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at 273–80. 
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the attempted impeachments of judges and discussions on how to reform 
the judiciary or nullify unjust decisions.37  
In addition to controversial decisions, the Constitutional Court was 
embroiled in scandals involving conflicts of interest and other 
inappropriate behaviors.  Erroneous comments and interviews were made 
by judges, some even on the bench.38  Judges hired their children as 
personal aides and recruited them as staff members.39  One even granted 
the Constitutional Court’s scholarship to his son for education abroad.40  
Despite numerous examples of judicial misbehavior, no judge has ever 
been held accountable.  In fact, the Constitutional Court behaved quite 
similarly to the politicians they condemned.          
In 2014, a coup d’etat helped end the conflict temporarily.  The 
2007 Constitution was abolished and replaced with the 2014 Interim 
Charter which gave the military junta total and absolute control over 
Thailand.41  But, unlike in 2006, the military junta, under the auspice of 
the National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), allowed the 
Constitutional Court to survive and continue exercising its judicial review 
power. 42   However, the Constitutional Court may not review 
constitutionality of orders and acts of the NCPO.43  In practice, when a 
democratic constitution is absent and the government has absolute 
impunity, judicial review is no longer meaningful.  The Constitutional 
                                                 
37  See generally Samudavanija, supra note 16; Duncan McCargo & Peeradej Tanruangporn, 
Branding Dissent: Nitirat, Thailand’s Enlightened Jurists, J. CONTEMP. ASIA. 1, 6–7 (2015).   
38  “Wasan” urges a look at English draft, KHAO SOD NEWSPAPER (June 7, 2012),  
http://www.khaosod.co.th/view_newsonline.php?newsid=TVRNek9EazVORGszTnc9PQ (Thai.) (the 
President of the Constitutional Court defended the Court’s decision by urging the public to rely on the 
English draft of the 2007 Constitution, an English draft of which did not exist); Bangkok Pundit, 
Constitutional Court Judge: High speed rail not necessary for Thailand, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT (Jan. 
9, 2014), https://asiancorrespondent.com/2014/01/constitution-court-judge-high-speed-rail-not-
necessary-for-thailand/ (Another well-known incident when the Constitutional Court judge complained 
during the hearing of the government’s high-speech rail project that he personally believed that the 
project was unnecessary because the government’s priority should have been to get rid of all gravel 
roads). 
39  Saksith Saiyasombut, New Leaked Video Dishes yet another Scandal at Thailand’s 
Constitution Court, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://asiancorrespondent.com/2010/11/new-leaked-video-dishes-yet-another-scandal-at-thailands-
constitution-court/. 
40  Anuphan Chantana, Judge upbraided for letting son go on paid study leave, THE NATION 
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Judge-upbraided-for-letting-son-go-
on-paid-study-l-30213603.html. 
41  Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, Thailand’s Newest Charter – A Quick First Look, 
CONSTITUTIONNET (July 24, 2014) http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/thailands-newest-charter-
quick-first-look.  
42  The National Council for Peace and Order Declaration No. 11/2557 (B.E. 2557, 2014).  
43  Thai Interim Constitution (B.E. 2557) — 2014 (§ 44,45). 
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Court has, so far, delivered a few decisions which were criticized as 
helping the junta maintain its authoritarian grip over Thailand.44    
From the moderately conservative beginning, the Constitutional 
Court had gradually gained public acceptance.  However, its conservative 
nature upset the public and led to its own demise.  The reinstated 
Constitutional Court was more aggressive, yet more polarized as well.  
While it was praised by many for providing checks-and-balances, others 
accused it of manipulating a government.  As the following cases 
revealed, no longer was it a neutral arbiter of Thai politics.   
II.   STRUGGLE TO RULE: CASE STUDIES  
Battles between civilian politicians and the Constitutional Court 
were most contentious during two periods: during 2008 and from 2012 to 
2014, when Thaksin-affiliated parties won general elections.  In 2008, the 
People’s Power Party (PPP), the descendant of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT), was in power with two prime ministers: Samak Sundaravej and 
Somchai Wongsawat.  Beginning in 2011 and continuing through 2014, 
Thaksin’s youngest sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, led the Pheu Thai (PT) 
government, 45  where from 2012 to 2014 the Constitutional Court 
delivered most of its controversial decisions.  These decisions had high 
political impact as they concerned key governmental policies and 
generated strong reactions from both Thaksin’s supporters and opponents 
such as criticism, prosecution, and even armed conflicts.46   Basically 
these cases were focused on two main issues: the executive’s treaty-
making power and the election of the Senate.  Both were the products of 
the 2007 Constitution’s attempts to prevent Thaksin Shinawatra’s return 
to power.47   
During his administration, Thaksin entered into many bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral agreements that many criticized as jeopardizing Thailand’s 
economy and society.48  Treaty-making under the 1997 Constitution was 
relatively easy.  Unless the treaty would (1) change Thailand’s territory, 
                                                 
44  Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, Thailand’s Referendum Roadblock, NEW MANDALA (Aug. 
4, 2016), http://www.newmandala.org/false-serious-business-thailands-referendum/. 
45  CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at 279–80.  
46  Enlightened Jurists’ Open Letters, ENLIGHTENED JURISTS, http://www.enlightened-
jurists.com/blog (Thai.) (criticism of the Constitutional Court’s decisions); Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 
From Market Place back to Battlefield: Thai-Cambodian Relations in the Age of a Militarized Politics, 
in GOOD COUP GONE BAD 253, 259–60 (Pavin Chachavalpongpun ed. 2014) (accounts of armed 
conflict and legal persecution). 
47  Borwornsak Uwanno, supra note 15, at 164–65.  
48  See Thitinan Pongsudhirak, The imperative of Thailand's trade policy, BANGKOK POST (Oct. 
23, 2015), http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/740160/. 
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(2) alter the jurisdiction of the State, or (3) require an act for 
implementation, the cabinet reserved its prerogative to proceed with the 
treaty without parliamentary approval. 49   Section 190 of the 2007 
Constitution reacted by expanding the categories of treaties that required 
legislative approval to any treaty which: (1) provides for a change in the 
Thai territories; (2) provides for a change in the Thai external territories 
that Thailand has sovereign right or jurisdiction over such territories 
under any treaty or an international law; (3) requires the enactment of an 
Act for its implementation; (4) has a vast impact on the country’s 
economic and social stability; or (5) has a significant binding effect upon 
the trade, investment, or budget of the country.50  Before entering into an 
agreement, the cabinet was required to provide a framework of the 
negotiation to the Legislative Assembly and the public  as well as a plan 
to relieve people who were likely to be affected by the treaty.51  If it is 
unclear whether a treaty falls under one of the five categories, the 
Constitutional Court would rule if that treaty meets the Section 190 
requirements. 52   The cabinet’s treaty-making power was then 
significantly limited.   
Prime Minister Thaksin was also condemned for puppeteering the 
Senate.  The Senate was supposed to be a non-partisan body which 
selected candidates for watchdog agencies.  But the fact that all the 
members of the Senate were elected by a vote of the people meant that 
several candidates relied on politicians’ existing networks and assistance 
to win elections.53  As a result, many senators were proxies of political 
parties or even relatives of politicians, rendering watchdog agencies such 
as the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) and the 
Election Commission (EC) weak and biased.54  The 2007 Constitution 
attempted to compromise by designing a half-elected, half-nominated 
Senate. 55   Still, the model was criticized for its lack of clarity.  
Nominations of senators were vulnerable to secret lobbying among a few 
members of the Senate nomination committee.56 
 
                                                 
49 Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2540) — 1997 (ch. 7 § 224). 
50  Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2550) — 2007 (ch.9 §190). 
51  Id.  
52  Id.  
53  Michael H. Nelson, Delaying Constitutionalism to Protect Establishment Hegemony in 
Thailand, in POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 49, 59 (Marco Buente & Bjoern 
Dressel eds., 2017); Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2550) — 2007 (ch. 5 §114). 
54  PHONGPAICHIT & BAKER, supra note 24 at 173–76. 
55 Michael H. Nelson, supra note 53, at 59–62. 
56  Harding & Layland, supra note 11, at 45. 
256 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.  26 NO.  2 
 
A. The Thai-Cambodian Joint Communique Case (2008) 
In 2008, Thaksin’s proxy, the People’s Power Party, won the 
general election and Samak Sundaravej, the PPP leader, became the 
Prime Minister.  His cabinet signed a Joint Communique (JC) with 
Cambodia, stating that Thailand would not raise an objection to 
Cambodia’s bid to unilaterally register Preah Vihear Temple as a World 
Heritage site. 57   The ruined temple, situated along the obscure Thai-
Cambodian border, was awarded to Cambodia by the International Court 
of Justice after years of bitter argument.58  Since both parties regarded the 
ruined temple as the pride of their ancient glory and greatness, there was 
very strong emotion attached to the case. 59   However, the boundary 
dispute between the two countries remained an unresolved ticking time 
bomb.    
From the government’s perspective, the Joint Communique (JC) 
was not a treaty, as it had no legal effect.60  They believed it did not 
encroach upon Thailand’s interest over the ill-demarcated boundary, a 
position guaranteed by Cambodia and UNESCO. 61   But the People’s 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which had rallied against Thaksin in 
2005-2006, saw the situation differently.  They believed that this JC 
might imply Thailand’s acceptance of Cambodia’s sovereignty over the 
disputed area adjacent to the Temple and therefore could potentially lead 
to territorial loss.62  Deliberately employing nationalistic rhetoric, PAD 
was able to mobilize massive and rather violent demonstrations to serve 
its goal of ousting Thaksin’s proxy. 63   The PAD accused Samak’s 
government of not following Section 190 procedures and brought the 
case to the Constitutional Court.64 
The Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that the JC was a 
treaty since it legally bound the two parties.65  The Constitutional Court 
                                                 
57  Chachavalpongpun, supra note  46, at 259–60. 
58  See Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 
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59  See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Temple of Doom: Hysteria about Preah Vihear Temple in the 
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61  Id. at 87–89. 
62  Chachavalpongpun, supra note 46, at 260. 
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64 Courts asked to nullify deal on Preah Vihear, BANGKOK POST (June 27, 2008) http://ki-
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65  Const. Ct. No. 6-7/2551, 2008, at 21. 
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was convinced that the JC might result in a change to Thailand’s territory 
because it accepted Cambodia’s right over the disputed vicinity of the 
Temple.66  Moreover, citing the PAD protest, the Court determined that 
the signing of the JC had immense effect on Thailand’s and Cambodia’s 
societies.67  
The decision was a huge blow to the Samak cabinet.  Although 
Samak cabinet had consulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Constitutional Court disagreed with the Ministry that this JC had legal 
effect as a treaty.68  The Constitutional Court read the law more broadly 
as well, determining that any treaty which “might” result in a territorial 
change must comply with Section 190. 69   Also, according to the 
Constitutional Court, the government failed to foresee the social impact 
of this treaty.  The burden of determining the social and economic impact 
of a proposed treaty was suddenly placed upon the cabinet’s shoulders. 
The 2007 Constitution provided no specific remedies for a 
violation of Section 190.  But Noppadol Pattama, the Foreign Minister, 
resigned. 70   The NCCC charged him and Samak with malfeasance, 
abusing their power, and deliberately causing Thailand to lose territorial 
interest.71  These charges created momentum for the PAD to continue 
protesting.  The protests escalated and resulted in airport closures a few 
months later. 72   The decision also strained the ties between the two 
nations and led to deadly skirmishes along the border.73        
B. The Constitution Amendment Series (2012-2014) 
The PPP government ended prematurely in December 2008 when 
the Constitutional Court dissolved the party under an electoral fraud 
charge.74  Abhisit Vejajiva of the Democrat Party, Thaksin’s rival, was 
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able to form a coalition government under the brokerage of the military.75  
His minority cabinet enjoyed a relatively peaceful period of 2009-2011, 
which benefited from no aggressive judicial review cases.  Thaksin’s 
supporters tried to organize mass demonstrations against Abhisit twice 
but both ended in violent military crackdowns.76  
Even Abhisit realized that the 2007 Constitution severely restricted 
his administration’s performance.  In 2010-2011, he carried out a minor 
political reform.  Two of the primary targets were the treaty-making 
clause and the mechanisms for Senate selection.  There was no 
constitutional challenge to Abhisit’s move but the half-hearted reform 
only added that there shall be laws clarifying criteria in the two cases.77  
These laws never came.  He later lost to Thaksins’ youngest sister, 
Yingluck, who led Pheu Thai (PT) party in the 2011 election.78   
As soon as Yingluck Shinawatra assumed the office of Prime 
Minister, she intended to fulfill her 2011 election campaign promise of 
further amending the 2007 Constitution.  The 2007 Constitution was 
unpopular not only because it deliberately crippled a popularly elected 
government, but also because it lacked legitimacy.79  It was drafted by the 
junta-appointed body with little outside participation so it was seen as the 
legacy of the military government, not of the people.  Even though the 
2007 Constitution was approved by referendum, many regarded that 
referendum process as rigged because supporters of the 2006 coup 
persuaded Thaksin’s followers that they had to accept the draft in order to 
end the military regime and they could later amend the law.80 
Attempts to amend the 2007 Constitution were made twice.  
Initially Yingluck attempted to introduce an independent body which 
would study and prepare new charter provisions.  After the first attempt 
failed, she chose a humbler path of amending only specific sections 
regarding the Senate and treating-making power.  The Constitutional 
Court struck down the second attempt in two separate lawsuits.  
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44 (Marc Askew ed., 2010); Pravit Rojanaphruk, Questions Loom over New Prime Minister’s 
Legitimacy, THE NATION (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.nationmultimedia.com/homeQuestion-loom-
over-new-Prime-Minister-s-legitimacy-30091207.html. 
76  Marc Askew, Confrontation and Crisis in Thailand, in LEGITIMACY CRISIS IN THAILAND, 
supra note 59, at 45–56 & 303–17.  
77  See Radthathammanoon (B.E. 2554) — 2011, amend. 1, amend. 2. 
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1. The Wholesale Amendment Attempt 
Yingluck’s first move was bold.  She planned to amend Section 
291, which prescribed the constitution amendment process.  According to 
Section 291, both houses of Parliament shall meet in a joint session to 
consider the motion to amend the constitution. An approval required a 
supermajority. 81   Yingluck intended to replace Section 291 with an 
amended provision creating the Constitutional Drafting Assembly that 
allowed for broader public participation in the amendment process similar 
to the 1997 CDA.  Her opposition certified the case to the Constitutional 
Court under Section 68.82 
Normally, a provision of law reviewable by the Constitutional 
Court strictly meant an organic act or a parliamentary statute.  A motion 
to amend the constitution, therefore, could not be filed through an 
ordinary judicial review channel.  However, Yingluck’s opponents 
claimed that an amendment was an act to gain power to rule the country 
through undemocratic means, which fell under Section 68.  Section 68 
provided the authority for an individual to petition to the Constitutional 
Court if he or she witnessed an act that jeopardized democracy or the 
constitution.83  But the government quickly pointed out that Yingluck’s 
opposition was not authorized to directly file a suit to the Constitutional 
Court.  To prevent a huge flood of frivolous lawsuits, Section 68 required 
the Attorney-General to investigate complaints and file the case, a 
precedent the Constitutional Court had always adhered to. 
Nonetheless, for the first time, the Constitutional Court ignored its 
precedent and accepted the claim without Attorney-General oversight.  
The Constitutional Court justified its acceptance of the case by 
determining that Section 68 actually provided a dual-track for judicial 
review. 84   The Court held that in urgent situations that required the 
immediate protection of democracy or the constitution, an individual 
could bypass the Attorney-General and submit a case directly to the 
Constitutional Court.85 
Despite hearing the case, the Constitutional Court did not find the 
motion for amendment unconstitutional.  The amendment proposal did 
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not explicitly state that it purported to take down Thailand’s democracy.  
That conclusion would be too far-fetched without observing practical 
effects of the new Constitution Drafting Assembly.  Nonetheless, the 
Constitutional Court suggested that since the 2007 Constitution was voted 
into effect, any proposal to amend the charter should have been approved 
by a referendum first.86  
Nowhere did Section 291 mention a referendum or other method of 
public participation.  It simply required an absolute majority and 
prohibited amending certain areas of the constitution.87   Given the lack 
of textual support, many view the Constitutional Court’s decision as an 
attempt to invent a constitutional barrier to thwart the government’s plan.  
Moreover, the language of the decision was ambiguous since the 
Constitutional Court did not explicitly demand a referendum, but merely 
recommended so.88  At first, MPs from the PT party moved to impeach 
judges for acting ultra vires.89  When anger over this attempted maneuver 
subsided, the government tried to compromise by postponing the 
amendment for more careful study.90          
2. The By-Section Amendment Attempt 
After months of dormancy, the government tried a different 
strategy.  It would proceed according to steps prescribed by Section 291 
to amend the 2007 Constitution to provide for popular election of all 
senators and shorten the treaty-making process.  However, the anti-
Thaksin faction directly filed complaints under Section 68 for the second 
time.   
The following two decisions encapsulated and clarified the 
Constitutional Court’s view of both proposed amendments.  In the case of 
the Senate election, the Constitutional Court explained its understanding 
of democracy stating that democracy was not always about the majority’s 
rule.91  Popular mandate could easily turn into tyranny by the majority.  
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Therefore, a democratic country needed be governed by the rule of law.92  
The 2007 Constitution’s goal was to create an honest and transparent 
government that acted in the best interests of the public. 93   The 
Constitutional Court was designated by the 2007 Constitution to ensure 
that the government respected the rule of law through the power of 
checks-and-balances.94 
The Constitutional Court found the government’s motion to amend 
the 2007 Constitution unconstitutional for two reasons.  On procedural 
grounds, the Court found that the government unduly changed the 
original bill and the President of the Parliament reduced the time allotted 
for parliamentary debate.95  Moreover, several MPs were absent at the 
time of voting, but they asked their peers to forge their vote.96  As the 
result, quorum was lacking and the process was undemocratic.   
On substantive grounds, the Constitutional Court saw the Senate as 
an important checks-and-balances mechanism because it appointed 
watchdog agencies and heard an impeachment trial of a parliamentary 
member.  It was, thus, important that the Senate maintained its 
independence from political parties.  An all-elected chamber would turn 
the clock back to 1997 when the whole Parliament was “the family 
business” of spouses in both Houses.97   This situation could lead to 
another crisis and another coup d’etat.  Because the government’s 
proposal could impair the Senate’s ability to check upon itself, the 
government was trying to gain the power to run the country through 
undemocratic means.98  The Constitutional Court spared the government 
by not dissolving the PT party.  But the NCCC prepared an impeachment 
of all MPs that voted in favor of the amendment proposal.99 
Critics pointed out that a senatorial election is a common practice 
in democratic countries. 100   How could more popular elections be 
undemocratic?  Further, there was no such prohibition in the 2007 
Constitution, and the House of Representatives was already full of MPs, 
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regardless of parties, with familial ties with one another.101  Thus, similar 
to the referendum requirement the Court divined within Section 291, it 
again imposed more restrictions than the Constitution provided. 
A few months later, the Constitutional Court delivered its third 
decision in the constitution amendment series.  The case concerned the 
amendment of Section 190 in order to simplify and eliminate ambiguity 
in the treaty-making process.102  The government planned to exempt from 
the constitutional requirements under Section 190 a treaty which (1) has a 
vast impact on the country’s economic and social stability, or (2) has a 
significant binding effect upon the trade, investment, or budget of the 
country.103  Similar to the procedural posture of the case examined above, 
the same party again filed a complaint under Section 68. 
The Constitutional Court’s decision was consistent with its prior 
ruling, reminding the government that Thai constitutional democracy 
does not require all matters to be decided by majority rule.  Further, 
democracy can become tyrannical if the majority ignores the rule of law 
or harasses the minority.104  The Constitutional Court had the duty to 
guard Thailand’s democracy by reviewing the government’s exercise of 
power.105  
The Constitutional Court found that the President of the Parliament 
closed debate on the amendment prematurely.  Although the government 
accused the opposition of using a foot-dragging technique to delay the 
consideration of the proposal, the Constitutional Court believed that it 
was important to give all stakeholders, especially the minority, a fair 
chance to express their views.106  According to the Constitutional Court, 
amending the constitution is a serious issue and the government could 
only move forward after careful and thorough consultation.107  
Also, the Court found that the substantive changes to the treaty-
making process violated the Constitution.  Citing the Joint Communique 
case, the Constitutional Court pointed out that entering into an 
international agreement could cause catastrophic damage to the country.  
Removal of a treaty from the procedural safeguards would deprive the 
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Legislative Assembly of the chance to scrutinize the Executive’s exercise 
of power.  The Constitutional Court compared the administrative burden 
with the benefit to the public and determined that the latter outweighed 
the former.  This amendment was intended by the majority party to evade 
the Thai system of checks-and-balances, so the Court viewed it as another 
attempt to gain the power to rule the country through undemocratic 
means.108 
The third decision ended the government’s dream of regaining its 
treaty-making authority.  The Constitutional Court’s reasoning signaled 
the Judiciary’s dwindling patience with the government’s action.  By the 
time of the third decision, Yingluck had made a grave mistake by forcing 
a universal amnesty bill through the Lower House. 109   The move 
infuriated the public because the breadth of its scope would immunize 
Thaksin from corruption charges as well as the army which was under 
investigation for manslaughter during political protests.110  After another 
troubled election which the opposition boycotted, the Constitutional 
Court invalidated the election, leaving the country in a political 
vacuum. 111   Further street demonstrations crippled the interim 
government well into May 2014, when the Constitutional Court vacated 
Yingluck from premiership for promoting her brother-in-law as the new 
National Police Chief.112  The Constitutional Court found that the Prime 
Minister had violated the rule of law because the  transfer was for her 
family’s personal benefit.113  The month-long political crisis reached a 
deadlock and General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the Army Commander, 
carried out the coup d’etat in May 2014.114    
III.   POLITICIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
The governing parties and the Constitutional Court focused on 
different notions of democracy.  Samak and Yingluck relied on popular 
mandate to formulate their key policies while the Constitutional Court 
stressed the need to respect the rule of law.  Both are correct and can 
                                                 
108  Id. at 21–25. 
109  Jeffrey Hays, 2013 Political Crisis after Yingluck Government Tries to Pass Amnesty Bill That 
Would Allow Thaksin to Return to Thailand, FACTS AND DETAILS, http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-
asia/Thailand/sub5_8a/entry-3201.html (last updated May 2014). 
110  Harding et al., supra note 79. 
111  James Hookway & Wilawan Watcharasakwet, Thailand Opposition Democrat Party to 
Boycott Election, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023
04866904579271862159417896. 
112  See Const. Ct. No. 9/2557, 2014. 
113  See id. at 32. See Radthathammanoon (B.E. 2550) — 2007, § 266. 
114  Duncan McCargo, Peopling Thailand’s 2015 Draft Constitution, 37 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 329, 333 (2015). 
264 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.  26 NO.  2 
 
potentially co-exist.  But one shall supplement the other.  While the 
Constitutional Court had to protect fundamental principles from the 
majority’s unwise decision, it was improper to dismiss the voice of the 
people completely. 
During 2008 and 2011-2014, the Constitutional Court played a 
major role in effectively obstructing the democratically elected 
governments from implementing key policies. 115   The Constitutional 
Court’s hostility to the wisdom of the majority was rooted in the rapidly 
changing political phenomenon, the ill-designed constitution, as well as 
the majority’s ignorance.  
Thaksin’s ultra-popularity relied heavily on support from the so-
called grassroots majority.  They had long been neglected by his 
predecessors.  His populist policies provided them a chance to gain 
political control, but this ascension alarmed the established elite who long 
dominated Thailand’s political resources. 116   This phenomenon was 
unprecedented.  The threat to their status quo urged them to remove 
Thaksin from power.  Unfortunately, Thaksin managed to monopolize the 
legislature so they had to resort to the judiciary.  The invalidation of the 
general election and the dissolution of TRT showed them how powerful 
the Constitutional Court could be, demonstrating that the 2007 
Constitution was designed to utilize judicial power to its fullest.   
At a constitutional level, the 2007 Constitution was drafted upon a 
faulty premise.  The judiciary was not guarding the constitution from a 
corrupt or arbitrary politician, but from Thaksin.  The Constitutional 
Court was equipped with the ultimate power to intervene in politics.  
Without a mechanism to ensure its accountability, the Constitutional 
Court’s almost absolute power was prone to be abused.  Moreover, at a 
personal level, anti-Thaksin figures were recruited onto the bench.117  As 
a result, the Constitutional Court represented the interests of the minority 
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to suppress Thaksin and his political allies.  But because Thaksin was the 
personification of electoral politics supported by popular elections, an 
anti-Thaksin Constitutional Court quickly became an anti-majoritarian 
one.  The politicized Constitutional Court was then dragged into 
contentious partisan political disputes.118 
In the 2008 case concerning the Thai-Cambodian JC, it was 
beyond doubt that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court.  But the two parties, the cabinet and judges, read the 
JC differently and the Constitutional Court did not defer to the Thai and 
Cambodian governments’ understanding.  The Constitutional Court 
speculated possible territorial loss that the government did not foresee.  
Also, the government did not have the benefit of hindsight concerning the 
societal disunity that the Constitutional Court enjoyed.  The Court’s 
disagreement was a departure from its usually deferential stance, which 
created a sense of uncertainty and paranoia in the executive branch.    
The series of cases between 2012-2014 were more interesting.  
Perhaps at this point, Thailand was more polarized politically.  By citing 
the rule of law, the Constitutional Court made a daring move to depart 
from its precedential decisions concerning Section 68.  Allowing direct 
petitions under Section 68 contradicted the text of law, the original 
intention, as well as common sense.  The first in the series was a mere 
suggestion, made out of the Constitutional Court’s creativity.  The PT 
government was willing to please the judiciary by delaying the move and 
switching to amending individual sections.  But still, the Constitutional 
Court was not pleased with that.        
Prime Minister Yingluck was also partially to blame.  Her 
government copied Thaksin’s modus operandi by silencing the opposition 
with its overwhelming popularity.119  It learned nothing from its past 
mistakes and arbitrarily rushed the consideration of the proposals.  The 
blatant ignorance of procedural safeguards led to its unsuccessful 
attempts to amend the constitution.120  The Constitutional Court was right 
that democracy, without the rule of law, could slide into popular 
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authoritarianism.  But the Constitutional Court did not stop there.  As it 
went on to review the substance of the amendments, it drew criticism of 
imposing its political preference while disregarding the wishes of the 
majority.  Its reasoning was questionable and also out of touch with the 
political reality. 
Accusing the government of gaining its power through 
undemocratic means was a punishment disproportionate to the 
government’s actions.  Such punishment signaled the National Counter-
Corruption Commission to prepare an impeachment of more than 300 
MPs who approved the amendment proposal.  An en masse impeachment 
could be seen as the punishment for siding with Thaksin.  These decisions 
confirmed the public’s suspicion of the Constitutional Court’s lack of 
neutrality.  Together with other controversial decisions and personal 
scandals, its credibility eroded fast.   
The rule of law was an ambiguous term.  Ambiguity could be 
useful and hazardous at the same time.  The Constitutional Court of 
Thailand was designed to be immune from almost all external 
interventions, so when it took full liberty in interpreting the term, the rule 
of law was used as a catch-all phrase to suppress the majority.  It enabled 
the Constitutional Court to cross the fine line and govern the country.  In 
order to prevent the tyranny of the majority, the Constitutional Court 
entrenched the oligarch’s presence in Thailand’s politics.  The minority 
might not be able to actively introduce its policies, but it could block ones 
from the majority and steer Thailand to its liking.  The Constitutional 
Court emphasized checks without balances. 
The coup d’etat is an epitome of the minority-majority struggle to 
rule.  Although the NCPO claimed that it came to end the conflict, it was 
obvious that the NCPO was acting on behalf of the anti-Thaksin faction.  
Thus, it showed no interest in addressing the problem of the 
Constitutional Court’s dwindling legitimacy.  Instead, it planned to 
transform the Constitutional Court to an even more powerful proxy of the 
minority establishment.121  Such a move was dangerous, for the damage 
to Thailand’s judiciary would be severe and long-lasting.    
Despite the current calmness on the surface, the Constitutional 
Court is still a source of tension and distrust within Thai society.  The 
Constitutional Court was seen as helping the minority side of the conflict 
to entrench their interests and presence while suppressing and ignoring 
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the majority.  Judges were allegedly asserting their personal opinion into 
reasoning and, as the result, acting as the government themselves.  The 
Constitutional Court is being accused of obstructing democratizing 
process rather than promoting it.  There is little wonder that, as soon as 
democracy resumes, the Constitutional Court will again be part of the 
political conflict. 
IV.   CONCLUSION  
High-profile cases from 2008 to 2014 indicate that the 
Constitutional Court had transformed from the guardian of the 
constitution to a powerful ally of the anti-democratic establishment.  
While the democratically elected government tried to regain the control 
over its exercise of power, the Constitutional Court struck these attempts 
down, claiming that they violated the rule of law.  This series of decisions 
against the governments drew heavy criticism that the Court was 
entrenching the minority’s control of Thai politics.  Although the 
Constitutional Court was designed to be immune from external oversight, 
it was trading its credibility over the expansion of the judicial power, the 
price so costly and damage irreparable. 
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